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COMMENTS
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DES MARKET
SHARE LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer products, seemingly innocuous when used by
the public years ago, have come to haunt twentieth century
society. "Indeed, certain products have achieved such national
notoriety due to their tremendous impact on the consuming
public that the mere mention of their names-Agent Orange,
Asbestos, DES, MER/29, Dalkon Shield-conjures images of
massive litigation. . . ."I As a consuming public we are de-
pendent upon product manufacturers to look to our safety
and well-being. A product manufacturer's misconduct quickly
ignites public outrage. Thus, mass products liability torts cre-
ate another vivid image-one of "infrequent, yet prevalent,
'big money' punitive awards."' Outraged by a product manu-
facturer's misconduct, consumers injured by defective prod-
ucts seek revenge through punitive damage awards.
California's liberal rules governing the award of punitive
damages support the notion that the manufacturer of a defec-
tive product should be severely punished. In recent years,
however, two major problems have arisen which complicate
punitive awards against manufacturers of mass produced
goods. First, is the ever-increasing phenomenon in which
plaintiffs are unable to identify the manufacturer of the prod-
uct which caused their injuries. Consumers injured by a fungi-
ble good which cannot be traced to a specific manufacturer
are unable to protect themselves against manufacturer mis-
conduct. Unless these plaintiffs are relieved of the burden of
© 1983 by Colleen T. Davies.
1. In re Dalkon Shield, No. C 80-2213 SW, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5,
1981).
2. Id.
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proving causation, punitive damage recovery becomes literally
impossible.
Second, the punitive damage doctrine, created in an era
of single-plaintiff versus single-defendant disputes,' does not
easily adapt to the complexities of mass tort litigation. De-
fects in a product manufactured on a national level may sub-
ject a defendant manufacturer to duplicative punitive damage
claims. Duplicative punitive awards can threaten the financial
solvency of a defendant thereby denying any redress to subse-
quent plaintiffs.
California statutory and case law unequivocally establish
a plaintiff's right to seek punitive redress against a defendant
guilty of willful or malicious conduct. On the other hand, pro-
tections under the United States Constitution guarantee to a
defendant the right to be protected from repeated punish-
ment for the same wrongful conduct. These constitutional
rights, however, conflict with those of each plaintiff injured by
a mass produced good.4
Both of these problems-the inability of injured consum-
ers to identify defendant manufacturers and the implications
of multiple punitive damage claims-arise in litigation con-
cerning diethylstilbestrol (DES). The California Supreme
Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,' left unanswered the
vital issue of whether punitive damages are recoverable under
a market share theory. This comment maintains that elimi-
nating plaintiff's proof of causation for punitive damages
claims would disturb apportionment of compensatory dam-
ages in market share suits as well as deny defendants their
due process rights by subjecting them to multiple punitive
3. Id. at 16.
4. The conflict is a frustrating one, inextricably bound to a complex, industrial
society which few of us wish to abandon. R. HEILBRONER, IN THE NAME OF PROFrr 191-
200 (1973).
5. Hundreds of products liability suits have been filed across the nation by
women alleging injuries to genital tracts as a result of in utero exposure within the
past twenty years to diethylstilbestrol (DES), a synthetic hormone prescribed to
women to prevent miscarriage. See S. FENCHELL, DAUGHTERS AT RISK (1981); Herbst,
Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Vagina, Association of Maternal Stil-
bestrol Therapy with Tumor Appearance in Young Women, 284 NEw ENG. J. MED.
390 (1971); Karnaky, Prolonged Administration of Diethylstilbestrol, 5 J. CLIN. EN-
DOCRINOL. 279-84 (1945); Smith, Prophylactic Hormone Therapy: Relation to Com-
plications of Pregnancy, 4 OBST. & GYN. 129 (1954).
6. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
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damage judgments. The comment will further demonstrate
that the rationale behind applying punitive damages has al-
ready been fulfilled by the Sindell decision without adding
punitive damage recovery.
II. THE SINDELL DECISION
A. Background of Diethylstilbestrol
A revolutionary breakthrough in estrogen research took
place in 1937 when British scientists first synthesized diethyl-
stilbestrol, a synthetic estrogen. Diethylstilbestrol could be
administered orally, effectively, and inexpensively to treat
women suffering from low natural levels of estrogen. By 1941,
after clinical testing in the United States, the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) had approved applications by numer-
ous pharmaceutical companies to market the drug for various
medical treatments, none involving pregnancy.8 When medical
studies at Harvard University revealed that pregnancy mis-
carriages could be successfully avoided by the administration
of estrogen, 9 pharmaceutical companies sought to manufac-
ture diethylstilbestrol for such purposes. 10 In 1947, the FDA
7. Estrogen is a sex hormone produced naturally by females. A medical team
directed by Drs. H.C. Dodds and Leon Goldberg and funded by the Medical Research
Council of Great Britain first synthesized the compound stilbestrol. The compound, a
scientific constant, was not patented. See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978); Ryan v. Eli Lilly, No. 77-246,
slip op. at 7 (D. S.C. May 14, 1981) (order affirming summary judgment). The
formula for DES is set forth in the United States Pharmacopoeia, and any manufac-
turer producing the drug must utilize the formula set forth in that compendium. See
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.2d 924, 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
145-46 (1980); 21 U.S.C. § 351(b).
8. See Comment, supra note 7, at 963 n.1 (1978); Ryan v. Eli Lilly, No. 77-246,
slip op. at 7 (D. S.C. May 14, 1981).
9. In 1930, faculty members Drs. George Smith and Olive Smith discovered that
hormonal deficiencies in pregnancy led to early miscarriage and that administration
of estrogen could treat these deficiencies. When synthetic hormones became available
in 1938, the Smith's clinical studies continued with the administration of the diethyl-
stilbestrol compound. See Smith, Prophylactic Hormone Therapy Relation to Com-
plications of Pregnancy, 4 OBST. & GYN. 129 (1954); Smith, Diethylstilbestrol in the
Prevention of Complications of Pregnancy, 56 Am. J. OBST. & GYN. 821 (1948). See
also Karnaky, The Use of Stilbestrol for the Treatment of Threatened and Habitual
Abortion and Premature Labor: A Preliminary Report, 35 S. MED. J. 838 (1942).
Contra Dieckmann, Davis, Rynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does the Administration of Di-
ethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?, 66 AM. J. OBST. & GYN.
1062 (1953).
10. Drug manufacturers independently prepared and filed new drug applica-
tions (NDA's). Among those filing during 1947 and 1948 were E.S. Miller Laborato-
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approved DES for the prevention of miscarriages; this author-
ized manufacturers to market DES on an experimental basis
with the requirement of a warning.1"
In 1952, the FDA removed the "new drug" status of
DES,12 thus allowing any drug company to manufacture it
without a license. Between 1947 and 1971, hundreds of drug
companies across the United States manufactured DES which
was prescribed to millions of women. s In 1972, the FDA
banned DES for miscarriage treatment after research revealed
a high correlation between synthetic estrogens used by preg-
nant women during 1947-1971 and a rare form of vaginal and
cervical cancer in the daughters of those women.14
ries, Boyle & Co., Premo Pharmaceutical Co., Grant Chemical Co., Physicians' Drug
& Supply Co., Eli Lilly & Co., Rexall Drug Co., E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., Abbott
Labs., and McNeil Labs., Inc. Each applicant made its own determination of what
constituted sufficient clinical evidence to support using DES to treat pregnancy
problems. No uniformity exists between these reports. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly, No. 77-
246, slip op. at 10-11 (D. S.C. May 14, 1981).
11. See Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976) (label re-
quirements for experimental drugs). The FDA now requires the following warning in
the sale of DES: "Vaginal adenosis has been reported in 30% to 90% of post-pubertal
girls... whose mothers received diethylstilbestrol or a closely related congener dur-
ing pregnancy. . . . The significance of this finding with respect to potential for de-
velopment of adenocarcinoma is unknown. Periodic examination of such patients is
recommended." 40 FED. REo. 32, 773 (1975).
12. See 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1976) (the term "not a new drug" means that the drug
is generally recognized among experts as safe under the conditions prescribed); Wein-
berger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 612-14 (1973). This status al-
lowed manufacturers to market DES without performing additional testing or sub-
mitting additional data to the FDA on the drug's safety. See Petitioner's Writ for
Cert. at 4, Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980).
13. Comment, supra note 7, at 964 n.3. The estimated number of pharmaceuti-
cal companies which manufactured DES for use in pregnancy is between 94 and 300.
Id.
14. The form of cancer from which these daughters suffer is known as adenocar-
cinoma which manifests itself after a minimum latent period of ten to twelve years. It
is a fast spreading and deadly disease, requiring radical surgery to prevent it from
spreading. DES also causes adenosis and precancerous vaginal and cervical growths,
which may spread to other areas of the body. The treatment for adenosis is cauteriza-
tion, surgery, or cryosurgery. Women who suffer from this condition must be moni-
tored by biopsy or colposcopic examination twice a year; a painful and expensive pro-
cedure. Thousands of women whose mothers received DES during pregnancy are
unaware of the effects of the drug. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 595, 607
P.2d 924, 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 138 (1980).
"Scientists discovered the link between DES and cancer by noting a sudden in-
crease in incidence of a rare form of cancer and then by taking highly detailed histo-
ries of the women exhibiting this disease, including maternal ingestion of drugs."
Comment, supra note 7, at 964 n.5. See also Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett,
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Today, one-half million "DES daughters" suffer from
clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and uterus and other
abnormalities. 5 Among the DES daughters is Judith Sindell,
who in 1980 sought the right to sue eleven major California
manufacturers of DES for $1 million compensatory and $10
million punitive damages."
B. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
Generally, the imposition of liability upon a defendant
rests upon plaintiff's showing that his or her injuries were
caused by defendant's act or by an instrument under defen-
dant's control. Due to the lapse of time and destruction of
concrete evidence, Judith Sindell could not identify which de-
fendant drug company manufactured the drug ingested by her
mother.17 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court held
that each defendant's liability for plaintiff's injuries would be
approximately equivalent to the percentage of DES it manu-
factured. Once a plaintiff joins a "substantial share" of the
DES market, each defendant is liable for "the proportion of
the judgment represented by its share of the market" unless it
can demonstrate that it could not have made the drug.'8 De-
Vaginal Cancer after Maternal Treatment with Synthetic Estrogens, 285 N. ENG. J.
MED. 390 (1971); Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 5. A more recent study is
HERBST & BERN, DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF DIETHYLSTILBESTROL (DES) IN PREG-
NANCY 64 (1981).
15. Comment, supra note 7, at 965.
16. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). The trial court sustained defendants' demurrers
without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiff did not identify which defendant
manufactured the drug responsible for her injuries. On appeal, respondents were: Ab-
bott Laboratories, Eli Lilly & Co., E.R. Squibb & Sons, The Upjohn Co., and Rexall
Drug Co. Judith Sindell initiated suit on behalf of herself and all other women simi-
larly situated. In addition to a monetary award for herself, Judith Sindell prayed for
equitable relief in the form of an order that defendants warn of the dangers of DES
and establish free clinics in California for DES victims. Id. at 595, 607 P.2d at 926,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
17. The court recognized that neither plaintiff nor defendant has any sure
means of identifying the maker of the drug ingested by plaintiff's mother. The court
noted that drug manufacturers ordinarily sell to wholesalers who supply the product
to physicians and pharmacies. The lapse of time, coupled with the generic nature of
DES, makes it almost impossible to determine the origin of the drug, the brand or
strength of dosage and the appearance of the medication. Id. at 599-602, 607 P.2d at
928-30, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136-38.
18. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. The court examined other
doctrines of liability in light of the DES controversy before adopting the market
share theory. The court first rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants were liable
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fendants, in turn, can cross complain against other DES man-
ufacturers not joined in the suit. It is unclear, however,
whether apportionment of the damages under the market
share theory strictly limits defendant's liability to its deter-
mined market share or subjects defendants to joint and sev-
eral liability for 100% of plaintiff's damages.19
In creating the market share theory, the court adapted
the rules of causation and liability to meet the "changing
needs" of our "complex industrialized society.""0 The court
reasoned that defendant manufacturers should bear the risk
of any loss to innocent consumers from fungible products that
cannot be traced to any one manufacturer.2 According to the
court, not only are defendants in a better position to bear the
cost of injury,22 but public policy mandates such liability to
promote product safety.23
The creation of market share liability established a major
victory for the hundreds of DES daughters in California who
could not meet the traditional threshold showing of causation.
Yet the market share theory stands subject to criticism. 24 The
under the concert of action doctrine developed in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199
P.2d 1 (1948) and prescribed in section 876 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
The court found no "tacit understanding or common plan" among defendants in the
production of DES as required under the concert of action doctrine. See Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 604-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
The court also rejected the argument that defendants were liable under the the-
ory of "enterprise" or "industry-wide" liability as proposed by a Fordham Law Re-
view Comment and argued by plaintiffs. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1002-07.
Industry-wide liability arose in Hall v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353 (N.Y. 1972), where the court held the entire blasting cap industry in the United
States liable for injuries caused by exploding caps. The court distinguished Hall,
which involved six defendant manufacturers who jointly controlled the safety stan-
dards within their trade associations, from the Sindell facts, which involved at least
200 DES manufacturers who were closely regulated by government FDA standards.
See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 607-10, 607 P.2d at 933-35, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 141-43. See generally Note, Market Share Liability Adopted to Overcome Defen-
dant Identification Requirement in DES Litigation, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571 (1981).
19. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
20. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
144.
21. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
22. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. See also Escola v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
23. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
145.
24. See generally Berns & Lykos, Sindell v. Abbott Labs-"The Heir of the
Citadel," 15 FORUM 1031 (1980); Note, supra note 18; Note, Market Share Liability:
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court refused to define a "substantial share of the market"28
and failed to address such issues as the statute of limitations,
multiplicity of judgments, and disproportionate shares of lia-
bility.2 6 With these and other issues still unresolved, plaintiffs
are regrouping at the trial court level to seek damage judg-
ments against joined defendants who will be liable in accor-
dance with their share of the DES market.27
In addition to compensatory damages, DES plaintiffs in-
variably seek punitive damages.s Although the Sindell court
recognized the dollar figure of plaintiff's punitive damage
claim,29 it remained silent as to whether the market share the-
ory would alter plaintiff's burden of proving causation for pu-
nitive damages. In the current proceedings at the trial level,
DES plaintiffs are arguing that the Sindell holding does ex-
tend to punitive damage recovery. Thus, if a plaintiff can
prove malicious or fraudulent conduct on the part of any de-
fendant, punitive damage liability will automatically attach
unless the defendant can prove it was not the manufacturer of
An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1981); Note, In-
dustry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980 (1979).
Several legislative proposals have attempted to undermine the market share the-
ory. See, e.g., S.B. 228, Cal. Leg., 1981-82 Regular Session (legislation introduced bySen. Ed Davis, D. L.A., on Feb. 5, 1981, which would eliminate liability for latent
product defects unless plaintiff could identify the manufacturer and would establish a
committee to study alternatives to the market share theory) (was voted down in com-
mittee on Jan. 19, 1982).
25. Plaintiffs in Sindell asserted that Eli Lilly and five or six other companies
produced 90% of the DES marketed. The court declined to comment on whetherplaintiffs had joined a "substantial share," preferring instead to leave trial judges the
discretion to determine this issue. The court stated: "While 75 to 80 percent of the
market is suggested as the requirement by the Fordham Comment, we hold only that
a substantial percentage is required." Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607
P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
26. See infra note 30.
27. In addition to Sindell, over 100 DES suits are currently filed in California
with plaintiffs seeking compensatory and punitive damages (letter from David L. Ba-
con, counsel for defendant Rexall Drug Co. (Feb. 8, 1982)).
28. Plaintiff Judith Sindell seeks compensatory damages of $1 million and puni-
tive damages of $10 million for herself. She alleges that defendants knew or should
have known DES was a carcinogenic substance; they failed to test DES for efficacy
and safety and the tests performed by others, upon which they relied, indicated that
the drug was not safe or effective. Plaintiff also contends that in violation of the FDA
requirements, defendants marketed DES on an unlimited basis rather than as an ex-
perimental drug and failed to warn of its potential danger. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26
Cal. 3d at 601-02, 607 P.2d at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
29. Id.
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the particular drug ingested by the plaintiff's mother.3 0
The recovery of punitive damages is one particularly
troublesome aspect of the practical application of Sindell.
The punitive damage doctrine, despite its acknowledged place
in the law, has been a target for substantial criticism.3 Any
expansion of its application-especially a reduction of plain-
tiff's burden of proving causation-is certain to raise strong
objections."'
III. THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Many states assess punitive damages in addition to com-
pensatory damages to serve four major purposes: deterrence,"8
punishment,84 additional compensation, 8 and retribution."
California first codified the doctrine of punitive damages in
1872 under section 3294 of the Civil Code.3 7 The modern ver-
30. Several defendants have filed demurrers arguing that punitive damages are
not recoverable under a market share theory unless plaintiff can identify the manu-
facturer of the drug. In Callish v. Eli Lilly, defendant's demurrer was granted on the
basis that plaintiff's allegations were insufficient with respect to intentional acts of
defendants. The court granted 20 days leave to amend. Motion to Strike, Callish v.
Eli Lilly, No. 291765 (Super. Ct. Sacr., Cal., May 18, 1982) (on file at the office of the
Santa Clara Law Review).
In Diamond v. Eli Lilly & Co., the judge sustained the same defendant's Motion
to Strike holding that punitive damages cannot be recovered unless plaintiff can iden-
tify who manufactured the DES or an appellate court rules that plaintiff can recover
on a market share theory. Notice of Ruling, Diamond v. Eli Lilly, No. C386960
(Super. Ct. L.A., Cal., July 23, 1982) (on file at the office of the Santa Clara Law
Review). See Notice of Ruling on Motion to Strike, McCree v. Abbott Labs., No.
C369449 (Super. Ct. L.A., Cal., Sept. 21, 1982) (demurrer to punitive damages
granted) (on file at the office of the Santa Clara Law Review).
31. Owens, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIC. L.
Rav. 1258, 1267 (1976). See also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342 (1873); Duffy, Punitive
Damages: A Doctrine Which Should Be Abolished, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAM-
AGES (pamphlet put out by the Defense Research Institute) (1969); Walther & Plein,
Punitive Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. Rav. 369, 371
(1965); Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797
(1979).
32. See generally Owens, supra note 31.
33. See Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 378, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970).
34. Ferraro v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 8 Cal. App. 3d 339, 87 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1970)
(Molinari, J., concurring).
35. See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, (1873) (reimbursement for certain non-com-
pensable damages); Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351 (1855).
36. See generally Owens, supra note 31, at 1270.
37. Section 3294 reads in part: "In an action for the breach of an obligation not
arising from contract, where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the
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sion of section 3294 allows punitive damages by way of exam-
ple and punishment when a defendant has been guilty of mal-
ice, fraud, or oppression. Retribution is no longer a valid
justification in California.8" In applying section 3294, a jury
must consider the financial condition of the defendant" and
assess the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's con-
duct. In doing so, it is not bound by any fixed ratio to deter-
mine the proportion between punitive and compensatory
damages. 0 Juries are not required to assess the ramifications
of multiple punitive awards for the same act, and appellate
reversal of punitive awards is granted only if the judgment
indicated passion and prejudice by the jury.1
Product liability suits accent the three major purposes
behind punitive damage awards in California. We live in an
age where consumers have little ability to protect themselves
against the threats of defective products which are often in-
visible to the human eye. Victims may be ignorant of their
legal rights to redress or incapable of meeting the high costs
of litigating against well-financed defense leagues. 2
Deterrence against the manufacturing and distribution of
defective products serves as one of the principle purposes be-
sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294
(West 1970 & Supp. 1982).
38. See generally Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 620 P.2d
141, 169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979); Wyatt v. Union Mortg. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d
45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1979); Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., 69
Cal. 2d 461, 446 P.2d 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1968); Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736,
336 P.2d 534 (1959); Gudarov v. Hadjieff, 38 Cal. 2d 412, 240 P.2d 621 (1952).
39. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Cal. 3d 910, 928, 582 P.2d 980, 990,
148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978); Coy v. Super. Ct., 58 Cal. 2d 210, 23 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1973); Rosener v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237
(1980).
40. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981) (punitive damages not confined to the maximum penalties under state and
federal statutes); Zhadan v. Downtown L.A., 66 Cal. App. 3d 481, 136 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1976) (the correct rule is that punitive damages must bear a "reasonable relation" to
the actual damage).
41. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839 (2d Cir. 1967)
(not fair to limit the punitive damage recovery to an indeterminate amount of first
comers); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 927-28, 582 P.2d 980, 990, 148
Cal. Rptr. 389, 399 (1978) (appellate court should only reverse a judgment that as a
matter of law appears grossly excessive so as to raise a presumption of prejudice).
42. It currently costs 77 cents to deliver 65 cents to a plaintiff in normal prod-
ucts liability suits. See Kinsley, Fate and Lawsuits, THE NEw REPUBLIC, June 14,
1980 at 20, 21.
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hind section 3294 of the California Civil Code."' Product
safety measures often decrease a manufacturer's profit mar-
gin. Unlike traditional non-commercial torts, compensatory
damages alone may not serve to deter against future wrongful
conduct since treating these damages as part of the cost of
doing business may be more profitable than remedying the
defect."
Punitive damages as a form of punishment vent public
and private outrage over a defendant's willful or reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others.45 Government regulations and
the criminal law have failed to provide adequate consumer
protection against the manufacturers of defective or danger-
ous products.4" The elusive nature and the remoteness of a
manufacturer's misconduct might make any offense "appear
as mere error in judgment hardly deserving of punishment or
condemnation. 4 7 Punishment may serve as a necessary and
effective reformative tool to educate the offender as to soci-
ety's legal and moral values in the safety and well-being of its
citizens.4 8 Furthermore, it allows the manufacturer to "atone
for [its] misdeeds through suffering" additional financial
loss. 4 9
Many courts refuse to recognize punitive damages as a
form of compensation since compensatory damages are as-
sessed to "make the plaintiff whole again. '" 6 Compensatory
43. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452,
457, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482, 487, cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1979); Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1980).
44. See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 929 n.14, 582 P.2d 980, 991
n.14, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, 400 n.14 (1978); Owens, supra note 31, at 1291.
45. Owens, supra note 31, at 1279.
46. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 382 (1981); Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap-
proach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 655-56 (1979); Owens, supra note 31, at 1288-89; De-
velopments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227 (1980). See also People v. Superior Ct., 96
Cal. App. 3d 181, 191, 157 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1979), cert. denied, Forest E. Olson v.
Superior Ct., 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
47. See generally Owens, supra note 31, at 1282.
48. Id. at 1281.
49. Id.
50. United States v. Magnolia Motor and Lodging Co., 208 F. Supp. 63, 66
(N.D. Cal. 1962); Coats v. Constr. and Gen. Laborer's Local No. 185, 15 Cal. App. 3d
908, 916, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (1971); DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. American Fed'n of
Labor, 215 Cal. App. 2d 560, 580, 30 Cal. Rptr. 350, 361 (1963). But see Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383 (1981).
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damages may not compensate, however, for the "enormous
diligence, imagination and financial outlay required of initial
plaintiffs to uncover and to prove the flagrant misconduct of a
product manufacturer." 51 Punitive damages provide a motive
for private individuals to enforce product safety standards
and enable them to recoup the expenses of doing so."
In Gombos v. Ashe, the California Supreme Court stated
that punitive damages "are not a favorite of the law" and
should be granted with the greatest of caution.53 The growing
frequency of high punitive damage verdicts, especially in
products liability actions, casts doubts on whether Gombos is
an accurate description of current judicial philosophy. It is
clear, however, that California imposes stringent proof and
causation requirements upon a plaintiff seeking punitive dam-
ages.5 4 To apply the market share theory for punitive damage
recovery would eliminate California's requirement that a
plaintiff prove causation. It would not, however, eliminate
plaintiff's burden of proof under section 3294 of the Civil
Code.
A. Punitive Damage Proof Requirements
Under section 3294, a plaintiff must find and introduce
evidence to demonstrate that the defendant is guilty of mal-
ice, fraud or oppression. The court in Davis v. Hearst,55 de-
fined "malice," the first of the section 3294 proof require-
ments, as "animus malus" or "evil motive." 56 Numerous cases
following Davis have interpreted malice to include only a ma-
licious intention to injure the one harmed, but also conduct
51. Owens, supra note 31, at 1325, quoted in 119 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 384.
52. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
53. 158 Cal. App. 2d 517, 526, 322 P.2d 933, 939 (1958).
54. Under CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982), punitive damages
may be awarded only if plaintiff pleads and proves that defendant with malice, fraud
or oppression committed a tortious act against plaintiff. James v. Public Fin. Corp.,
47 Cal. App. 3d 995, 1000, 121 Cal. Rptr. 670, 673 (1975). See also Hale v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974); Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 891, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972). "To establish that there was a 'tortious act,'
plaintiff must, of course, prove not only the existence of an actionable wrong, but also
that damages resulted therefrom." 47 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 673
(emphasis added).
55. 160 Cal. 143, 116 P. 530 (1911).
56. Id. at 164, 116 P. at 540.
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evincing "a conscious disregard of the safety of others.""7
Courts define fraud in the context of section 3294 to in-
clude intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of
a material fact with an intention to cause injury.58 "Of all the
civil liabilities, fraud is the most difficult to establish.""
Fraudulent misrepresentations are "made with intent to in-
duce action by some particular person or persons in reliance
on it; defendant is liable only to those persons to whom the
representation was made with such intent."60
Section 3294 also permits punitive damages in cases
where proof of oppression is established. Courts find oppres-
sion to exist when a person consciously disregards the rights
of another so as to place him under cruel and unjust
hardship. 1
DES plaintiffs seek to recover punitive damages by show-
ing that defendant drug companies acted with malice and
fraud in the testing, marketing, and distribution of the drug.
California courts have awarded punitive damages against
pharmaceutical companies found guilty of fraud and malice.
In Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,6 2 the court awarded $175,000
compensatory and $500,000 punitive damages against the
manufacturer of MER/29, a drug designed to lower blood cho-
lesterol. Evidence existed that defendant concealed testing re-
sults and fabricated other test data to obtain FDA approval to
57. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 808, 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 381 (1981) (listing cases following Davis including: Dawes v. Superior Ct., 111
Cal. App. 3d 82, 88, 168 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322 (1980); Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 3d
890, 895-96, 598 P.2d 854, 856, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693, 696 (1979); Searle v. Superior Ct.,
49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 30-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 223-24 (1975); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 713-14, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 415-16 (1967)).
For cases in which the court found malice in fact, see Taylor v. Superior Ct., 24
Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1979) (drunken driver causes serious
injuries to an innocent plaintiff); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (manufacturer defers corrective measures on defective autos
to save money and enhance product sales); Barth v. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App.
2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (tire manufacturer and installer fails to warn a driver
of the dangers of overloading tires).
58. Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 715, 60 Cal. Rptr.
398, 411 (1967).
59. Owens, supra note 31, at 1279.
60. 4 B. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW § 467 (8th ed., 1973).
61. See Richardson v. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102
Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972) (insurer refused to settle an insured's claim in good faith); but
see Trammell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 538, 129 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1976).
62. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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market MER/29. s The Toole court held that defendant's con-
duct exhibited the requisite malice and fraud under section
3294 to warrant the punitive award."
California courts would require that DES plaintiffs sup-
port their complaints for punitive damages with facts which
are not simply "opaque, unstable and compound aver-
ments." 6 In Searle v. Superior Court,66 plaintiff sued for in-juries allegedly resulting from use of an oral contraceptive
manufactured and sold by two drug firms. Plaintiff claimed
punitive damages, alleging that defendants placed the product
on the market with knowledge of its hazards in complete dis-
regard of the safety of others. The court sustained a demur-
rer to the punitive damage claim and held that plaintiffs
failed to plead facts sufficient to show fraud, malice, or op-
pression. The court emphasized that conclusory allegations of
fraud, malice, or oppression cannot be sustained by liberal
rules of construction.0 8
Given California's strict proof requirements for punitive
damages, DES plaintiffs face serious evidence gathering
problems to prove that defendant manufacturers acted mali-
ciously or fraudulently. Because a DES plaintiff cannot usu-
ally isolate the one manufacturer of the drug ingested by her
mother, she faces the enormous expense and difficulty of gath-
ering evidence to meet section 3294 requirements for eachjoined market share defendant. Plaintiffs cannot simply allege
that all defendants acted maliciously by adhering to an indus-
try-wide standard for manufacturing and distributing DES. In
fact, the Sindell court rejected the notion that defendants
acted under a common plan or scheme in marketing DES. 9
Thus, plaintiff must prove fraud, malice, or oppression as to
each individual defendant.
Discovery, calculated to reveal fraud, malice, or oppres-
63. Id. at 711-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 414-16. Defendant Richardson-Merrell had
conducted experiments for several years with MER/29. These tests revealed unfavor-
able data on blood and eye changes in the test animals including eye optities and
blindness. Defendant concealed these tests' results, even after first reports of eye
cataracts in humans were received.
64. Id.
65. Searle v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 27, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218, 221 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
68. Id. at 29, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23.
69. 26 Cal. 3d at 604-06, 607 P.2d at 932-33, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 140-41.
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sion, would require tracing the history of each manufacturer's
marketing activities including initial testings, clinical re-
search, labeling techniques, compliance with FDA standards,
and distribution procedures. Proving fraud or malice may be
difficult, as the FDA strictly monitored the drug companies
until 1952, at which point DES was no longer considered a
"new drug."'7 0
If a plaintiff could show a DES manufacturer's inten-
tional effort to conceal the dangers of the drug, as in Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell,7 1 then this could establish malicious and
fraudulent conduct. Similarly, a manufacturer's purposeful
deviation from FDA standards, such as initially marketing
DES on an unlimited basis rather than as an experimental
drug, may suffice as proof of malice. Or, if a plaintiff could
prove that the defendant failed to warn of the drug's potential
dangers, fraudulent misrepresentation might be found. The is-
sue would arise, however, as to whether the plaintiff, as a fe-
tus in utero, actually relied upon any of the defendant's repre-
sentations. It is questionable whether the plaintiff could claim
the necessary reliance element of fraud through her mother. 2
Should a plaintiff be able to prove malice or fraud on the
part of any employees of defendant drug companies, Califor-
nia law requires evidence that the employer-manufacturer
participated in, or subsequently ratified, the wrongful acts
with full knowledge. 78 This presents an additional burden for
70. See supra note 12.
71. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
72. In Justus v. Atchison, the California Supreme Court held that for purposes
of a wrongful death claim, a fetus in utero is not a human being. 19 Cal. 3d 564, 577-
80, 565 P.2d 122, 130-33, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 105-08 (1977). Applying this rationale, the
argument may be made that DES daughters, as fetuses in utero, could not have relied
upon any fraudulent misrepresentations made by DES manufacturers. However, in
Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., a California appellate court recognized that punitive
damages can be properly awarded against a defendant in a wrongful life action on
behalf of a child born with genetic defects. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477
(1980). The Curlender court saw no reason in public policy or legal analysis for ex-
empting a defendant from liability for punitive damages if defendant failed to pro-
vide proper genetic counseling to minor child's parents. Id. at 832, 165 Cal. Rptr. at
490. Under the Curlender rationale, DES plaintiffs may argue that neither public
policy nor the fact that plaintiff was a fetus in utero at the time of defendant's
wrongful acts can restrain a court from awarding punitive damages.
73. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(b) (West Supp. 1982) reads:
An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a),
based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer
had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed
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DES plaintiffs who attempt to decipher corporate and mana-
gerial actions occurring as early as 1940.
Despite evidence gathering and proof problems, DES
plaintiffs allege in their complaints that defendant manufac-
turers knew or should have known that DES is a carcinogenic
substance and that there was a grave danger, after varying pe-
riods of latency, that it would cause cancerous growths in the
daughters of women using the drug. 4 Plaintiffs also allege
that defendants failed to adequately test DES, meet FDA
standards, and warn of the drug's potential dangers. 5 Yet,
even if plaintiffs can unmask conduct evidencing malice and
fraud under section 3294, DES plaintiffs still face the almost
impossible burden of proving causation under section 3294.
B. Punitive Damage Causation Requirements
Normally, a defendant can only be held liable in a tort
action if there was a causal connection between the plaintiff's
injuries and the defendant's act.7 6 Because a punitive damage
claim cannot even be brought unless a tort has occurred, cau-
sation has always been equally required for a punitive damage
claim.7 "Evil thoughts or acts, barren of result, are not the
him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or
authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are
awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. With
respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge, ratification or
act of oppression, fraud or malice must be on the part of an officer, di-
rector or managing agent of the corporation.
See also Henderson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 140 Cal. Rptr. 388(1977); Hale v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. App. 3d 681, 117 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974);
Ebaugh v. Rabkin, 22 Cal. App. 3d 891, 99 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1972); Mason v. Drug, Inc.,
31 Cal. App. 2d 697, 88 P.2d 929 (1939).
74. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 593-94, 607 P.2d at 924, 925-26, 163
Cal. Rptr. 132, at 133-34.
75. Id. at 594, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. Because defendants adver-
tised assurances that DES was safe and effective to prevent miscarriages, plaintiffs
allege fraudulent misrepresentation existed. Id.
76. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971) (the causal rela-
tionship cannot be a "mere possibility"). A causal link between defendant's product
and plaintiff's damages is essential under any products liability theory. See Atkins v.
County of Sonoma, 67 Cal. 2d 185, 430 P.2d 57, 60 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1967) (negligence);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963) (strict liability); Garmen v. American Clipper Corp., 117 Cal. App. 3d 634,
173 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1981) (breach of warranty).
77. Section 3294 requires actual damages before punitive damages can be as-
sessed, which means that a tortious act committed against the plaintiff must be
proven initially. Werschkull v. United Cal. Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 981, 1003, 149 Cal.
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subject of exemplary damages."78
In certain types of cases, punitive damages claims have
required causation even when the underlying tort did not nec-
essarily require it. For instance, in suits against the estate of a
deceased tortfeasor, the estate is not liable for punitive dam-
ages unless the estate itself is guilty of malicious conduct
which directly harmed plaintiff.79 Similarly, in cases where
joint tortfeasors exist, no single tortfeasor may be held liable
for punitive damages unless the plaintiff can isolate that par-
ticular tortfeasor's malicious conduct as the cause of his
injuries.80
A showing of a causal connection in any claim for puni-
tive damages remains a stringent requirement for two reasons.
First, the rationale behind punitive damages-deterrence,
punishment, and compensation-is undermined unless the
tortfeasor who actually caused the injury is held liable. Sec-
ond, when a defendant must produce evidence in defense of a
punitive damage claim, fairness demands that he receive ade-
quate notice of the nature and effects of his wrongful conduct.
Traditional causation requirements mandate dismissal of
a plaintiff's punitive damage claim at the pleading stage even
if the plaintiff could prove fraud, malice, or oppression on the
part of each defendant manufacturer.8 " DES plaintiffs are not
able to identify which defendant manufactured the specific
drug ingested by their mothers. It would thus appear that
plaintiffs are back to their starting point-unable to recover
under a theory of law that requires strict adherence to the
rules of causation.
Should plaintiffs be denied punitive redress? The fact
that fungible goods used generations ago have threatened the
health of millions of women sparks a desire to punish every
Rptr. 829, 843 (1978) (construing CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294). See supra note 54.
78. 85 Cal. App. 3d at 1002, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (emphasis added).
79. See Holm Timber Industries v. Plywood Corp., 242 Cal. App. 2d 492, 51
Cal. Rptr. 597 (1976); Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 149 (1956).
80. California permits the apportionment of punitive damages between joint
tortfeasors depending upon the degree of culpability among them. Thus, punitive
damages could be awarded against several defendants in differing amounts. See
Thomson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 271 P. 198 (1928); Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143,
116 P. 530 (1911); Kim v. Chinn, 56 Cal. App. 2d 857, 133 P.2d 677 (1943).
81. Under Searle v. Superior Ct., 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975),
plaintiffs must establish facts which are not "opaque and unstable" in complaints for
punitive damages. If plaintiff cannot meet this burden, there is a greater likelihood
that demurrers to punitive claims by defendant manufacturers would be sustained.
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manufacturer who marketed the drug. Yet, punitive damage
awards under a market share theory may not be the most ef-
fective way of channeling society's outrage.
IV. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARKET SHARE LITIGATION
At the heart of the Sindell decision lies a recognition that
unless courts fashion remedies to meet the changing needs of
this era of mass production, consumers suffering permanent or
fatal injuries caused by fungible goods go uncompensated.82
DES plaintiffs seek to extend this rationale to aid their claims
for punitive damages in market share suits. Plaintiffs argue
that punitive damages should be allowed despite lack of cau-
sation if plaintiff can prove fraud, malice, or oppression on the
part of any one or more joined defendants. Thus, punitive
damages would attach unless defendant demonstrated that it
could not have caused plaintiff's injuries. Recovery of punitive
damages under a market share theory, however, will detrimen-
tally affect allocation of compensatory damages as well as
cause constitutional violations of due process.
A. The Effect of Punitive Damages on Allocation of Com-
pensatory Damages
The Sindell court's discussion of how damages will be al-
located under a market share theory could be interpreted in
two ways.85 First, a defendant's liability in non-identification
cases could be limited to its share of the DES market. Thus, if
plaintiff Sindell were able to join 80% of the DES market
with Company X making up 10% of that figure, X would be
liable for no more than 10% of Sindell's damages. This would
limit Sindell's recovery to 80% of her total damages as each
defendant's liability could not exceed its own market share.
This interpretation is supported by the Sindell court's desire
to make "each manufacturer's liability . ..approximate its
responsibility for the injuries caused by its own products.""
A second interpretation would make all defendants joined
by plaintiff Sindell jointly and severally liable for 100% of her
82. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
at 144.
83. See Case Comment, Refining Market Share Liability: Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, 33 STAN. L. REV. 937, 941-42 (1981).
84. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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damages.8 ' Thus, if Sindell joined 80% of the DES market
represented by Company X (with 10%), Company Y (with
30%), and Company Z (with 40%), each company would be
liable for its own market share plus its pro-rata share (1:3:4)
of the missing 20% market share. This interpretation explains
why the Sindell court referred to a defendant's ability to cross
complain against other DES manufacturers not joined in the
action.8 It is also supported by dissenting Justice Richard-
son's comments that the market share theory makes defen-
dants "bear effective joint responsibility for 100% of plain-
tiff's injuries despite the fact that their market share may be
considerably less."'87
Regardless of which interpretation applies, extending the
market share theory to punitive damage recovery would detri-
mentally affect the allocation of compensatory damages.
Under Thomson v. Catalina,"e there is no joint and sev-
eral liability for punitive damage awards. Thus, if proof re-
quirements for punitives are satisfied and causation require-
ments are eliminated under a market share theory, each drug
company will be liable for punitive awards according to its de-
gree of culpability.
A DES plaintiff joins several drug companies and pre-
sumably will not be able to show that each acted with fraud,
malice, or oppression in the manufacturing and distribution of
DES. The result is that those few defendants who acted mali-
ciously or recklessly will be the subject of hundreds of puni-
tive damage claims.
Multiple punitive damage claims against any one market
share defendant, coupled with liability for compensatory dam-
ages, could threaten the immediate bankruptcy of that defen-
85. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Ct., 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578
P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
In Baxter v. Scottish Rite Temple Ass'n, 86 Cal. App. 3d 618, 150 Cal. Rptr. 511
(1978), a co-defendant with a smaller amount of damages assessed against it than the
other co-defendant was held liable for the entire judgment assessed against both de-
fendants under joint and several liability. Likewise, market share liability may result
in drug companies with small market shares assuming liability for plaintiff's entire
claim. See Berns & Lykos, supra note 24, at 1034.
86. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. If liability
could never exceed a defendant's market share, no incentive would exist for cross-
complaining against other DES manufacturers not joined in the suit.
87. Id. at 617, 607 P.2d at 904, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
88. 205 Cal. 402, 271 P. 198, (1928).
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dant.8 9 Regardless of which interpretation of compensatory
damage allocation is employed, the bankruptcy of a defendant
drug company has serious implications.
Under the first interpretation of allocating compensatory
damages, each defendant's market share of DES is the upper
limit of liability in non-identification cases. Should a defen-
dant go bankrupt from punitive damage awards, subsequent
plaintiffs will not be able to collect the full amount of com-
pensation due them. They will only receive the percentage of
their award which will equal the percentage of financially sol-
vent defendants joined in their action.
If the second interpretation of allocation applies, defen-
dants are jointly and severally liable for compensatory dam-
ages. Thus, if one defendant is rendered bankrupt by punitive
damage claims, the remaining defendants become subject to
increased liability for compensatory damages.
Punitive damages under a market share theory may also
violate due process rights to rational rules of procedure and
evidence.90
B. Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Against Market
Share Defendants
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit is among the few courts which have addressed the ques-
tion of whether multiple punitive damage awards against a
single defendant result in denial of due process. In Roginsky
v. Richardson-Merrell,91 plaintiffs sued for compensatory and
punitive damages for personal injuries arising from taking
MER/29. Judge Friendly, realizing that the punitive damage
claims against Richardson-Merrell ran into the tens of mil-
lions, wondered how they could be administered "so as to
avoid overkill. '9 2
Judge Friendly struck down the trial court's punitive
damage judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence of man-
89. "The purpose of punitive damages is to sting, not to kill. Punitive damages
should not be permitted to bankrupt a defendant." In re Dalkon Shield, No. 80-2213
SW, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1981) (quoting Wynn Oil Co. v. Purcolator
Chemical Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Fla. 1974)).
90. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 429 (1969).
91. 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
92. Id. at 839.
1983]
204 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
agement misconduct.9 8 He observed:
We know of no principle whereby the first punitive dam-
age award exhausts all claims for punitive damages and
would thus preclude future judgments; if there is, Toole's
judgment in California ... would bar Roginsky's.
Neither does it seem fair or practical to limit punitive re-
coveries to an indeterminate number of first comers, leav-
ing it to some unascertained court to cry, "Hold enough,"
in the hope that others would follow. 94
The California punitive damage award referred to by
Judge Friendly was in Toole v. Richardson-Merrell.9 5  In
Toole, defendant's final argument asserted that a punitive
damage award would constitute double jeopardy since, in ef-
fect, it imposed a penalty without the constitutional safe-
guards accorded to those accused of a crimeY6 The court, in
rejecting this argument, stressed the civil nature of the action
and pointed out that the constitutional guarantees defendant
claimed were denied applied strictly to criminal proceedings.
93. The trial court awarded $17,500 compensatory and $100,000 punitive dam-
ages. Judge Friendly reversed the punitive award notwithstanding evidence of care-
lessness, failure to exercise proper supervision, and possible bad judgment in failing
to withdraw the drug from the market based on evidence of its cataractogenic quali-
ties. Id. at 832.
Judge Friendly also noted the contrast between the potential million dollar lia-
bility for punitive damages and the maximum fine for violation of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act-a penalty of "imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or a fine of not
more than $10,000 or both such imprisonment and fine." Id. at 839.
94. Id. at 839-40.
95. 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). See supra note 63. The trial
court granted defendant's motion for a new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion of $500,000 punitive award to $250,000. Id. at 693-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
96. Id. at 716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18. The principle of double jeopardy is to
prohibit the defendant from the risk of being tried or punished twice for the same
offense. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
97. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 717, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 421. The argument that the double
jeopardy prohibition applies to civil proceedings as well as criminal proceedings is
supported by civil cases which strike down the imposition of double punishments for
the same wrongful conduct. See Defendant's Motion to Strike Allegations of Punitive
Damages from Amended Complaint, Arceneaux v. Johns-Mansville Corp., No. C 185
141 (Super. Ct. L.A., Cal. April 30, 1981) (memorandum citing the following cases:
Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973) (due process principle of double jeopardy
held applicable in civil juvenile delinquency proceeding); Hultin v. Beto, 396 F.2d 216
(5th Cir. 1968); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 811, 174 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 383 (1981) (rejecting argument similar to one made in Cohan; court cited
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1976)); Lemer v. Boise Cascade, Inc., 107
Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 165 Cal. Rptr. 555, 558-59 (1980); Cohan v. Dept. of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 76 Cal. App. 3d 905, 143 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1978) (multiple civil pun-
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Among the most recent pronouncements on duplicative
punitive damage awards is Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Com-
pany.9 8 The Grimshaw court rejected defendant's argument
that the possibility of other punitive damage awards would vi-
olate due process." Despite the court's willingness to award
punitive damages, 100 Grimshaw is significant in that it identi-
fies the potential for abuse of due process rights arising from
multiple punitive awards." 1 Its dictum may be prophetic.
A California U.S. District Court, in In Re Dalkon
Shield,10 2 recently took a first step toward amelioration of
multiple punitive damage abuses. The Dalkon court certified
a class action joining all California claims against A.H. Rob-
ins, Inc., the manufacturer and distributor of an allegedly de-
fective intrauterine device called the Dalkon Shield. The class
action order attempts to coordinate some 1,573 suits involving
claims for punitive damages. 0
The Dalkon court recognized that a defendant has a due
process right to be protected against unlimited multiple pun-
ishment for the same act.
A defendant in a civil action has a right to be protected
against double recovery not because they violate "doublejeopardy" but simply because overlapping damage
awards violate that sense of "fundamental fairness"
which lies at the heart of constitutional due process.
ishments for the same conduct violated due process).
98. 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) (suit against manufacturer
of 1972 Ford Pinto by passenger who suffered severe burns and by heirs of driver,
who suffered fatal burns in accident). At the trial court level, the jury awarded$2,516,000 compensatory and $125 million punitive damages based on automobile de-
sign defects.
99. Id. at 812, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
We recognize the fact that multiplicity of awards may present a prob-
lem, but the mere possibility of a future award in a different case is not
a ground for setting aside the award in this case .... If Ford should be
confronted with the possibility of an award in another case for the same
conduct, it may raise the issue in that case.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. Appellate court upheld punitive award which had been remitted from $125
million to $3.5 million. Id. at 812, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49.
101. The court refused to be the judicial forum to cry "Hold enough!" due to
Ford's particularly malicious conduct. Evidence existed that despite Ford manage-
ment's knowledge that the fuel system could be made safe at a mere cost of four to
eight dollars per car, it decided to defer corrective measures to save money and en-
hance profits. Id. at 777-78 n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62 n.2.
102. No. C 80-2213 SW, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1981).
103. Id. slip op. at 3.
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Certainly the principle of res judicata, the notion that liti-
gation must come to an end, that a party cannot sue or be
sued repeatedly on the same cause of action, is part of the
process that is due under our constitutional system."0'
The Dalkon court examined the total spectrum of secur-
ing punitive damages in mass tort litigation. The existence of
a limited fund in most mass tort cases subjects defendants to
bankruptcy threats and plaintiffs to "a serious risk of being
told that the amount awarded in the first case represented an
implied finding of the maximum amount the defendant
should be punished." 10' Class action certification ensures all
plaintiffs of some proportionate share of any punitive damage
recovery and avoids the risks of a disproportionately punished
defendant.10"
Reducing DES plaintiffs' causation requirements en-
hances the due process problem of multiple punitive damage
awards against a particular defendant. Not only will it allow
more duplicative punitive damage awards, but it will also al-
low many of them to be made to plaintiffs that were not
harmed by the defendant's malicious conduct. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that limitations, up to
and including elimination, may be placed on the power of
courts to award punitive damages if there exists a strong
countervailing interest. 10 7 A defendant's right to fundamen-
tally fair procedures as guaranteed by due process militates
against the reduction of DES plaintiffs' burden of proving
causation and the allowance of punitive damages in market
share suits.
Two alternatives exist to solve this dilemma. First, courts
can limit the right to recover punitive damages.108 Thus, a
court could absolutely deny punitive damage recovery in DES
cases. Second, as in the California Dalkon litigation, courts
can utilize the class action device to prevent multiplicity of
punitive damage claims.
A class action would be most effective where DES plain-
104. Id. slip op. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 12.
106. Id. at 7-8.
107. See International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42,
48-52 (1979) (labor policy), cited in No. C 80-2213 SW, slip op. at 13. See also Gertz
v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (first amendment).
108. See No. C 80-2213 SW, slip op. at 12-13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1981).
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tiffs join suit against a single defendant who is identified as
the manufacturer of the drug ingested. 109 In these situations, a
class action for punitive damages, as well as for compensatory
damages, promotes equitable distribution of damages. The
majority of DES plaintiffs, however, cannot isolate a single
defendant. The potential constitutional violations under these
circumstances may be too great to allow punitive damage
recovery.
V. SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. The Risk to Progress
When diethylstilbestrol was first marketed for pregnancy uses,
the drug's potential appeared revolutionary to medical socie-
ties, to the FDA, and to women who suffered from pregnancy
difficulties. Today, some twenty years later, we seek to reduce
causation requirements in order to impose punitive sanctions
on manufacturers who tested, marketed, and distributed the
drug. We want to punish and deter any malicious acts regard-
less of whether we can match defendant's conduct with plain-
tiff's injury.
Before traditional causation requirements can be elimi-
nated for punitive damage recovery, certain social considera-
tions must be weighed. On the one hand, society has a strong
interest in imposing punitive sanctions upon a DES manufac-
turer guilty of wrongful conduct. On the other hand, society
recognizes the social utility behind pharmaceutical research
and development.110 This policy is evident in comments to the
109. Some plaintiffs, who recalled either the brand and strength of DES dosage
or the appearance of the medication, have isolated the specific defendant manufac-
turer of the drug ingested. Similarly, some defendant manufacturers have exculpated
themselves by demonstrating that they had not manufactured DES during the periodplaintiff's mother took the drug. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d
at 930, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
110. [T]he social and economic benefits from the mobilizing of the indus-
try's resources in the war against disease and in reducing the costs of
medical care are potentially enormous .... The potential gains from
further advances remain large. To risk such gains is unwise. Our major
objective should be to encourage a continued high level industry invest-
ment in pharmaceutical research and development.
SCHWARTZMAN, THE EXPECTED RETURN FROM PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH: SOURCES OF
NEW DRUGS AND THE PROFITABILITY OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 54 (1975). See
also McCreery v. Eli Lilly, 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 86-87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 730, 736 (1980).
See generally Coggins, Industry-Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 980, 1004
(1979).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts:
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental
drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportu-
nity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no as-
surance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredi-
ents, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medi-
cally recognized risk."'
Extending the market share theory to punitive damage
recovery may tip the balance sought between these social poli-
cies in favor of the imposition of punitive damages and
against pharmaceutical development. Such an imbalance may
risk gains from further medical and pharmaceutical advances.
The risk to progress in the pharmaceutical field suggests
that perhaps punitive damages are not appropriate in cases
involving drug-induced injuries. California courts, however,
have awarded punitive damages in cases against drug compa-
nies. In Searle v. Superior Court,112 the court stated that "[a]
products liability action may furnish the occasion for [puni-
tive damage] award[s], provided that the suppliers' conduct
satisfies the exemplary damage criterion of the particular ju-
risdiction."1 s Market share liability, if applied to punitive
damage recovery, would alleviate causation criterion under
section 3294. This complicates the determination of whether
DES actions are suited for punitive awards. Thus, instead of
evaluating section 3294 criterion as suggested by Searle, it
might be more helpful to examine the reasons why society im-
poses punitive damages and whether they can be fulfilled in
market share cases.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402a, comment k, explanatory notes
(Tent. Draft No. 4 1981) (recognizes drugs as "unavoidably unsafe products" so as to
prohibit the imposition of strict liability for any "unfortunate circumstances").
112. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
113. Id. at 26, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (quoting Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967)). See M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILITY § 9.07(2)
(1974); 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 33.01(7) (1966); SWARTZ,
HAZARDOUS PRODUCTS LITIGATION § 7.6 (1973); P. Reingold, The MER/29 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REv. 116, 134 (1968); cf.
Wennerholm v. Stanford Univ. Sch. of Med., 20 Cal. 2d 713, 128 P.2d 522 (1942);
Comment, Strict Liability in Tort: Its Applicability to Manufacturers of Prescrip-
tion Drugs, 7 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 487 (1974).
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B. Can Rationale Behind Punitive Damages Be Fulfilled by
Compensatory Damages in Market Share Cases
Courts will not impose a punitive award unless the pur-
poses behind these damages-punishment, deterrence, and
compensation-will be effectuated. In DES litigation, it may
be that the market share theory for compensatory damages
already has fulfilled the purposes behind the punitive damage
doctrine.
When Sindell adopted the market share theory, it, in ef-
fect, carried out the punishment and deterrence of defen-
dant's conduct in the manufacturing of DES. This resulted
from the economic ramifications of defendant's liability. If
market share liability assesses joint and several liability
against defendants in the entire amount of damages sus-
tained, compensatory damages attributable to the market
share of absent manufacturers 14 will be added to the defen-
dant's own share. A defendant's liability under this interpre-
tation of Sindell will almost always exceed its market share,
which alone can amount to astounding figures. By imposing
market share liability, the Sindell court might have succeeded
in punishing and deterring DES manufacturers from market-
ing potentially dangerous drugs without the need for punitive
damages.
Sindell also implemented the compensatory aspect of pu-
nitive damages. Because punitive damages are based on the
total net worth of the defendant rather than the actual dam-
age suffered by the individual plaintiff' 15 they can compensate
plaintiffs for costs not otherwise recoverable. The Sindell
court, in creating market share liability, looked not only to the
"actual damage suffered" by DES plaintiffs, but to the "total
net worth" of defendant manufacturers. Of course, market
share liability for compensatory damages may not compensate
plaintiffs for litigation costs. Nonetheless, it is clear that the
114. Justice Richardson, dissenting, assumed that no other state would adopt
market share liability, and concluded that those defendant manufacturers brought to
trial in California would ultimately bear joint responsibility for 100% of plaintiff's
injuries rather than the percentage of their market share. This would result, accord-
ing to Richardson, because only a certain number of manufacturers (five in Sindell)
were amenable to suit in California. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 617-18, 607
P.2d at 940, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
115. In re Dalkon Shield, No. C 80-2213 SW, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5,
1981).
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court stretched traditional boundary lines of tort law in order
to compensate plaintiffs.11
VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court in Sindell created a revo-
lutionary theory to solve some critical problems inherent in
DES litigation. If Sindell is interpreted as having eliminated
the causation requirement for punitive claims as well as for
compensatory claims, it would not only significantly enhance
existing problems with punitive damage awards, 117 but it
would also threaten the soundness and validity of the Sindell
market share theory itself. Early punitive damage awards
would bankrupt defendants and thereby disrupt later com-
pensatory claims.11 8 Furthermore, the Sindell market share
theory may already satisfy the main purposes behind punitive
awards in California.1 9
California courts should decide that they have gone far
enough in DES litigation. Going further by reducing causation
requirements for punitive damage claims may, in fact, be a
step backward. It is an appropriate time for courts to say
"Hold enough," thereby preserving the benefits of Sindell
while guarding against its potential excesses.
Colleen T. Davies
116. Retribution is a function of punitive damages not fulfilled by Sindell, but
retribution is not a valid justification for punitive damages in California. See supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 91-113 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
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